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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Ortiz was charged with possession of methamphetamine after officers found 
methamphetamine on the floorboard of the passenger compartment of the car he was 
driving. The methamphetamine was collected, along with other debris on the floor, and 
sent to the lab for testing. At trial, Rachel Cutler, a forensic scientist, testified that when 
she weighed the substance she did not separate the debris from the methamphetamine, 
stating that it was not necessary as weight was not an issue in this case. 
Following her testimony, the State was allowed to introduce evidence regarding 
the typical amount of methamphetamine used at one time, how methamphetamine is 
usually packaged on the street, and the cost of one dose, over the objection of defense 
counsel. The State used this information to argue that Mr. Ortiz knew the 
methamphetamine was there because it was a significant amount of the drug. During 
its closing arguments, the State also argued that the forensic scientist testified that the 
amount of methamphetamine at issue was over 3.5 grams, although she never testified 
to how much the methamphetamine weighed versus the debris. 
Mr. Ortiz contends the district court erred when it allowed the State to elicit 
testimony regarding how methamphetamine is used, packaged, and sold because this 
information was more prejudicial than probative in this case. Mr. Ortiz also asserts that 
the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial when he committed misconduct by 
impermissibly misrepresenting the testimony of Rachel Cutler, resulting in fundamental 
error. Finally, he contends the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of his right 
to a fair trial, resulting in cumulative error. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
Mr. Ortiz was pulled over by Officer Wiggins after Mr. Ortiz pulled out from what 
the officer believed was a known drug house. (Trial Tr., p.82, Ls.3-8, p.84, Ls.2-13.) 
According to Officer Wiggins, he paced Mr. Ortiz going over the speed limit. (Trial 
Tr., p.85 L . l l  - p.87, L.13.) While Officer Wiggins was writing a citation due to Mr. Ortiz 
failing to provide insurance, he called Officer Case, the canine handler, to respond to 
the scene and have his canine perform a free air sniff around the vehicle. (Trial 
Tr., p.89, Ls.1-25.) After Officer Case deployed his dog, the dog indicated on the door 
handle of the vehicle's front passenger side. (Trial Tr., p.166, L.22 - p.168, L.19.) 
Mr. Ortiz was then asked to get out of the vehicle, and because his demeanor was 
agitated, Officer Case patted him down for weapons. (Trial Tr., p.168, L.22 - p.769, 
L.23.) While patting Mr. Ortiz down, Officer Case found what he believed was a 
methamphetamine pipe. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.1-20.) Mr. Ortiz was then placed under 
arrest for possession of paraphernalia. (Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.7-9.) Officer Wiggins then 
continued to search Mr. Ortiz and discovered $3,000 in cash in one of Mr. Ortiz' 
pockets. (Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.10-21.) 
Officer Wiggins subsequently also searched Mr. Oritz' car. (Trial Tr., p.94, 
L.12 - p.95, L.6.) When he opened up the passenger side door of the Dodge Stratus, 
he saw a white crystal substance on the floorboard, just in front of the passenger seat 
area. (Trial Tr., p.94, L.12 - p.95, L.6.) Officer Wiggins suspected that this substance 
was methamphetamine so he contacted Ken Mencl, a narcotics investigator, and asked 
him to respond to the scene. (Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.12-20.) Investigator Mencl collected 
the majority of the crystals, scrapping up as much of the crystals as he could with a card 
and placing them in a plastic bag, and turned them over to Officer Wiggins. (Trial 
Tr., p.102, Ls.14-18, p.203, Ls.3-8, p.204, L.24 - p.205, L.2.) Although the substance 
was not sticking to the carpet, it was mashed down into the carpet and required a 
significant amount of effort to try to gather it up. (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.14-21.) Officer 
Wiggins collected the remainder of what he could and later placed it into evidence. 
(Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.19-23.) Once the vehicle was taken into custody, Investigator Mencl 
used a vacuum cleaner with a filter to try to vacuum any remaining evidence and placed 
this filter into evidence as well. (Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.3-22.) There was also some other 
debris that was collected with the crystals when they were gathered up by the officers. 
(Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.11-13.) A plastic baggie was also found in the vehicle and 
collected. (Trial Tr., p.206, Ls.11-17.) The plastic bag and filter of suspected 
methamphetamine were sent to the State lab for testing. (Trail Tr., p.135, L.2 - p.139, 
L.14; State's Exhibit 1 .) 
Mr. Ortiz was ultimately charged by Information with possession of a controlled 
substance, and an enhancement for this being his second offense of the Uniform 
Controlled Substance Act. (R., pp.57-60.) The case eventually proceeded to trial. 
(R., pp.174-76.) 
At trial, Rachel Cutler, a forensic scientist with the State Police Forensic Services 
testified that she tested the evidence in State's Exhibit 1. (Trial Tr., p.128, L.7 - p.152, 
L.ll.) She explained that the evidence she received contained a tied plastic baggie 
with crystals and various debris. (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.2-3.) When she weighed the 
substance and debris it weighed 3.82 grams total. .I 1 grams were used to test the 
substance, leaving 3.71 grams, which were repackaged. (Trial Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.140, 
L.5.) Ms. Culter testified that from the tests she performed she was able to identify the 
substance as methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.10-14.) 
During her testimony, Ms. Cutler also testified that she was not able to determine 
how much of the 3.82 grams was methamphetamine and how much was debris, 
explaining that it was too time consuming to separate the debris from the crystals and 
that she did not believe doing so was necessary in this case. (Trial Tr., p.142, 
Ls.10-23.) She explained that because she was not looking at a trafficking quantity, and 
because the debris was not substantial enough to "greatly affect" her weight, she chose 
not to remove it. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.15-23.) 
Later, when the State began asking Officer Mencl about quantities of 
methamphetamine and how much is usually used at one time, the defense objected to 
this line of questioning. (Trial Tr., p.209, L.8 - p.211, L.9.) Counsel for Mr. Ortiz argued 
that this testimony was more prejudicial than probative, noting that in this case the 
methamphetamine was not separated from the debris and that the State had already 
taken pains to elicit answers that the amount of methamphetamine was not a concern in 
this case. (Trial Tr., p.210, L.8 - p.212, L.24.) The district court overruled the objection 
and allowed the testimony to continue stating the quantity of drugs was relevant to show 
an inference that Mr. Ortiz had knowledge of their presence and that it was not unduly 
prejudicial to Mr. Ortiz. (Trial Tr., p.213, L.4 - p.214, L.11.) Officer Mencl then testified 
that "one hit" of methamphetamine is usually between and eighth and a quarter of a 
gram, and that an eighth of a gram would sell for approximately $25, a quarter of a gram 
would sell for about $50, and a gram would sell for about $100. (Trial Tr., p.214, 
L.20 - p.215, L.4.) He also testified that it is not very common for people to purchase 
more than one, two, maybe three hits at a time, and that a gram usually lasts about 
three to five hits. (Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.10-21.) 
The State relied on this testimony throughout its arguments to the jury, arguing 
that based on Investigator Mencl's testimony Mr. Ortiz had a significant amount of drugs 
and that someone would not have this much drugs and not know it. (Trial Tr., p.254, 
Ls.5-13, p.275, L.21 - p.276, 1.4.) In his closing statements, the prosecutor aiso 
argued "As the criminalist Rachel Cutler told you, that debris, as far as the weight of it 
towards the total weight, was insignificant. And so this basically was in the 
neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight full of methamphetamine." (Trial 
Tr., p.253, L.25 - p.254, L.4.) 
Mr. Ortiz was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and pled guilty 
to Part 11 of the Information alleging this was his second drug offense. (R., p.176.) He 
was sentenced ten years, with two years fixed, and the district court retained jurisdiction 
for 180 days. (R., pp.188-99.) Mr. Ortiz filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district 
court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.200-02.) Following the period of retained 
jurisdiction, Mr. Ortiz' sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for 
three years. (Augmentation: Order Upon 180-Day Review ~earing.)' 
' A Motion to Augment the record with a copy of the Order Upon 180-Day Review 
Hearing was filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on March 18, 2009. As of this writing 
an Order has not been issued on this motion. 
ISSUES 
I 1. Did the district court err allowing the State to introduce testimony regarding 
typical methamphetamine use, packaging, and sales, because this testimony 
was more prejudicial than it was probative? 
I 
2. Did the State violate Mr. Ortiz' right to a fair trial, by committing prosecutorial 
I 
misconduct during closing arguments when he misrepresented Ms. Cutler's 
I testimony? 
3. Did the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence and the prosecutor's 
misconduct result in cumulative error depriving Mr. Ortiz of a fair trial? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Allowina The State To lntroduce Testimony Reclardinq 
Ty~ical  Metham~hetamine Use, Packaqina, And Sales, Because This Testimony Was 
More Preiudicial Than It Was Probative 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it allowed the State to elicit testimony from 
lnvestigator Mencl regarding the typical amount of methamphetamine used at one time, 
how methamphetamine is usually packaged on the street, and the cost of one dose, 
because the risk of prejudice from this information substantially outweighed the 
probative value in this case. Moreover, that error cannot be harmless as it was used by 
the State to support its argument that Mr. Ortiz had knowledge of the methamphetamine 
found on the floor of his passenger compartment. 
B. The District Court Erred By Allowinq The State To lntroduce Evidence Reaardina 
Tvpical Methamphetamine Use. Packaainq. And Sales, Because This Testimony 
Was More Preiudicial Than It Was Probative 
Mr. Ortiz contends that the district court should not have allowed the State to 
question lnvestigator Mencl regarding typical methamphetamine use, packaging, and 
sales, because the risk of prejudice from this testimony outweighed the probative value. 
Under ldaho Rule of Evidence 403, the determination to admit or exclude relevant 
evidence is made by the trial court by balancing the probative value of the evidence 
against the dangers of unfair prejudice, distraction, confusion of the issues, and waste 
of time. Masters v. Dewey, 109 ldaho 576, 579, 709 P.2d 149, 152 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Therefore, once it is determined that the evidence is relevant and material as to an 
issue of fact, the court must then determine whether the risk of prejudice to the 
defendant from the admission of the evidence is outweighed by its probative value. 
I.R.E. 403; State v. Enno, 119 ldaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991). 
The determination of whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs the 
probative value is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sfafe v. Eyfchison, 136 ldaho 
210, 215, 30 P.3d 988, 993 (Ct. App. 2001). On appeal, to determine whether the 
district court exercised its discretion, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry, 
looking at: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as a discretionary 
one; (2) whether the lower court acted with the outer bounds of its discretion and 
consistently with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the district court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sfafe v. Hedger, 115 ldaho 598, 600, 68 
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). Here, even though, as the defense admitted, the testimony in 
question had some relevance, the district court abused its discretion when admitting the 
evidence because the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect because the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, misleading, and could easily 
confuse the jury. 
When the State began asking Officer Mencl about quantities of 
methamphetamine and how much is usually used at one time, the defense objected to 
the line of questioning. (Trial Tr., p.209, L.8 - p.211, L.9.) Counsel for Mr. Ortiz 
explained that he was objecting to this line of questioning based on relevance arguing 
that this was more prejudicial than probative. (Trail Tr., p.210, Ls.9-14.) He explained, 
[TJhe state has gone to pains, especially with Rebecca Culter in 
eliciting answers that the weight is not a concern here, that any amount is 
against the law.. . . 
And now the state wishes to go into how was it packaged, what's 
an eight ball, how much value does it bring and into any number of 
questions that can be asked regarding that issue, when that is not the 
issue as to my client, since any amount can be an indicia of guilt and that 
has already been shown. 
(Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.14-25.) Counsel for Mr. Ortiz explained that there was "some 
relevancy to the questioning;" however, the prejudice in going into this line of inquiry 
when Mr. Ortiz was not charged with delivery, attempted delivery, trafficking, etc. where 
weight and distribution would be relevant, outweighed the probative value of this 
testimony. (Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.1-9.) 
The State then explained that it was offering this testimony to demonstrate 
Mr. Ortiz' knowledge stating, "this evidence is to rebut any inference that a person who 
may have placed it there wouldn't have placed that amount of methamphetamine 
accidentally." (Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.14-18.) The prosecutor explained further that this 
evidence would go to whether it would be reasonable for anyone else to have lost that 
amount of methamphetamine in the car without realizing it or intentionally placed such a 
significant amount there and that, because the jury does not know anything about drug 
culture. they are not going to understand this unless they are familiarized with the 
standard amounts used. (Trial Tr., p.211, L.21 - p.212, L.9.) 
The district court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony to continue 
stating the quantity of drugs was "relevant to show by inference that that knowledge was 
present." (Trial Tr., p.213, Ls.4-12.) In addressing the prejudicial effect versus the 
probative value of allowing the testimony in, the district court stated "[o]f course it's 
prejudicial, but I don't find that it's unduly prejudicial under Rule 403." (Trial Tr., p.213, 
Ls.10-20.) Officer Mencl then testified that "one hit" of methamphetamine is usually 
between an eighth and a quarter of a gram, and that an eighth of a gram would sell for 
approximately $25, a quarter of a gram would sell for about $50, and a gram would sell 
for about $100. (Trial Tr., p.214, L.20 - p.215, L.4.) He also testified that it is not very 
common for people to purchase more than one, two, maybe three hits at a time, and 
that a gram usually lasts about three to five hits. (Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.10-21.) 
However, this evidence should not have been allowed in because even if 
relevant, there was a significant risk of prejudice by allowing the evidence in. The 
appropriate test under I.R.E. 403 is not whether prejudicial evidence is unduly 
prejudicial, but whether the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative 
value. I.R.E. 403; Sfafe v. Spor, 134 ldaho 315, 319, 1 P.3d 816, 820 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Therefore, the district court failed to apply the proper legal standard to its determination. 
See id. 
Furthermore, application of the proper standard reveals that the risk of unfair 
prejudice outweighed any probative value the testimony may have had because the 
actual weight of methamphetamine in this case was unknown. The ldaho Court of 
Appeals has stated that "[tjhe greater the amount of a controlled substance found in a 
defendant's possession, the greater the inference of knowledge and control." State v. 
Groce, 133 ldaho 144, 152, 983 P.2d 217, 225 (Ct. App. 1999). However, in this case 
evidence regarding the significance of the weight should not have been admitted 
because the weight was not the exact weight of the methamphetamine but, rather, it 
was the weight of the substance mixed with debris. During her testimony, Ms. Cutler 
testified that she was not able to determine how much of the 3.82 grams was 
methamphetamine and how much was debris. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.10-23.) She 
explained that because the weight was not at issue in this case and because the debris 
was not substantial enough to "greatly affect" the weight she chose not to remove it. 
(Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.15-23.) Therefore, the weight of the methamphetamine specifically 
is unknown; however, this line of questioning encourages the jury to proceed or assume 
that the weight of everything in the baggie is the weight of the methamphetamine, 
unduly prejudicing the defendant and confusing the jury. 
Therefore, the district court erred in allowing the State to present testimony 
regarding the typical amount of methamphetamine used at one time, how 
methamphetamine is usually packaged on the street and the cost of one dose because 
the prejudicial effect of this testimony outweighed any probative value it had. 
C. The Error In Admittina This Evidence Was Not Harmless 
ldaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that, "any error, defect, irregularity, or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." In State v. Seitter, 127 
ldaho 356, 900 P.2d 1367 (1995), the ldaho Supreme Court stated for error to be 
harmless, "'we must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no 
reasonable possibility that [the] evidence complained of contributed to the conviction."' 
Id. at 358, 900 P.2d at 1369. It cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
testimony admitted in this case was not harmless. 
Here, the State used the testimony regarding the typical amount of 
methamphetamine used at one time, how methamphetamine is usually packaged on the 
street, and the cost of one dose, to argue that Mr. Ortiz had to have placed the 
methamphetamine on the floor because no one would just leave this amount of 
methamphetamine in someone's car. In his closing statements, the prosecutor argued 
that as Investigator Mencl told the jury, a gram of methamphetamine goes for $100; 
therefore, there was $350-$400 worth of methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.6-10.) 
The prosecutor then asked, "is this the type of amount that someone would accidentally 
leave there on the floorboards or is it an amount that was placed there for some 
purpose?" (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-13.) 
Later in his rebuttal, the prosecutor again stated, 
And so ask again whether it makes sense that someone would just 
inadvertently spill and leave that amount of methamphetamine in that 
particular car. Officer Mencl told you that kind of a single user amount 
would be about one-sixteenth to on-eighth of a gram and you can do the 
math. And if you go with one-sixteenth, that's going to come out to about 
in excess of 50 uses. At one-eight its [sic] going to be around 27 to 30 
uses. 
(Trial Tr., p.275, L.21 - p.276, L.4.) 
Furthermore, the prosecutor acknowledged that this was a circumstantial case as 
far as proving that Mr. Ortiz had knowledge of the substance. (Trial Tr., p.276, Ls.5-10.) 
Therefore, the evidence presented regarding methamphetamine use, packaging and 
sales went to the heart of the prosecutor's case and its use cannot be deemed 
harmless. 
The State Violated Mr. Ortiz' Riaht To A Fair Trial By Committinq Prosecutorial 
Misconduct During Closing Arguments When He Misrepresented The Testimonv Of 
Ms. Cutler 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ortiz asserts that the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 
1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, when he impermissibly misrepresented the evidence 
presented at trial during the testimony of Rachel Cutler. Furthermore, this misconduct 
amounted to fundamental error and was not harmless. 
B. Fundamental Error Occurred In This Case When The State Misre~resented The 
Testimonv Of The Forensic S~ecialist. Ms. Cutler. Reqardinq The Weiqht Of The 
Methamphetamine In This Case 
Although there was no objection to the prosecutor's comments during closing 
arguments in this case, prosecutorial misconduct can be reviewed for fundamental error 
when there has not been an objection made below. See State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 
571, 165 P.3d 273,285 (2007); State v. Kuhn, 139 ldaho 710,715,85 P.3d 1109, 1114 
(Ct. App. 2003). A fundamental error is one that "'so profoundly distorts the trial that it 
produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due 
process."' State v. Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 470, 163 P.2d 1175, 1182 (2007) 
(quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003); State v. 
Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 11 1 (1991)). It has been defined as an error 
which "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or ... to the foundation of 
the case or take[s] from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and 
which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." Id. (quoting State v. Bingham, 
116 ldaho 415,423,776 P.2d 424,432 (1989)). 
The ldaho Court of Appeals has held that "[p]rosecutorial misconduct rises to the 
level of fundamental error wheh it is calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and 
arouse prejudice or passion against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors 
may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." Kuhn, 139 ldaho 
at 715, 85 P.3d at 11 14. The prosecutor's actions or comments must be so egregious 
or inflammatory that a curative jury instruction could not have remedied the misconduct. 
Id. This reflects the rationale behind the rule, that even if the defendant had made a 
timely objection to the inflammatory statements, the objection would not have cured the 
inherent prejudice. Id. This also reflects the fact that the trial court itself possesses the 
power to sua sponte intervene when prosecutorial misconduct is sufficiently egregious 
and prejudicial. State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 88 n.2, 156 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (Ct. App. 
2007) (noting that "[tlhe trial courts of this state possess authority and are encouraged 
to monitor the course of closing arguments, to sua sponte intervene as warranted, and 
to impose remedies or sanctions as appropriate to protect an accused's right to a fair 
I 
trial"). Therefore, when reviewing a question of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate 
Court must first determine whether the complained about conduct was improper, then, if 
I so, whether the misconduct impinged on the defendant's right to a fair trial, or whether 
the misconduct was harmless. Kuhn, 139 ldaho at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114. 
In this case, the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument when 
he misrepresented Ms. Culter, the forensic specialist's testimony. In his closing 
statements the prosecutor argued "As the criminalist Rachel Cutler told you, that debris, 
as far as the weight of it towards the total weight, was insignificant. And so this 
basically was in the neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight full of 
methamphetamine." (Trial Tr., p.253, L.25 - p.254, L.4.) However, in her testimony, 
Ms. Culter never testified that the weight of the methamphetamine by itself was 
approximately the same as the weight including the debris or that it was "in the 
neighborhood of three and a half grams weight full of methamphetamine." 
During her testimony, Ms. Culter repeatedly testified that she could not determine 
the weight of the methamphetamine versus the weight of the debris in this case. (Trial 
Tr., p.128, L.7 - p.152, L.l l.) She explained that it was too time consuming to separate 
1 
the debris from the crystals and that she did not believe doing so was necessary in this 
case. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.10-23.) She also explained that because she was not looking 
at a trafficking quantity and because the debris was not substantial enough to "greatly 
affect" her weight, she chose not to remove it. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.15-23.) Later she 
did testify that by looking at the sample one could tell that the controlled substance 
outweighed the debris. (Trial Tr., p.142, L.24 - p.143, L.13.) However, she also stated 
she could not guess what percentage of the substance was methamphetamine 
explaining, 
We're not allowed to do any guessing in my field to determine the 
percent, you would have to do something called quantitative analysis. 
Idaho Code does not require knowing what percent the substance is, just 
the presence thereof is illegal. So quantitative testing was not performed 
in this case. 
(Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.3-9.) 
Finally, when questioned by the prosecutor regarding whether the debris was of 
an insignificant weight, Ms. Cutler explained "I just noted that I didn't feel the debris was 
substantially affecting my total weight." (Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.15-24.) The prosecutor 
than asked if it was still her opinion that whatever debris was contained with the 
methamphetamine would be insignificant, to which she responded affirmatively. (Trial 
Tr., p.150, Ls.4-7.) 
The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause's prohibition on knowingly using 
false evidence to obtain a conviction, applies not only to entirely fabricated evidence, 
but to arguments that misstate the evidence adduced at trial. See Miller v. Pate, 386 
U.S. 1, 7 (1967); United States v. Fearns, 501 F.2d 486, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1974). 
Although counsel for both sides are generally afforded considerable latitude in closing 
arguments, and are entitled to discuss fully the evidence adduced at trial and inferences 
that can be drawn from that evidence, it is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the 
evidence. Phillips, 144 ldaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. Therefore, a prosecutor cannot 
misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence during his closing arguments. Id. 
Here, taken in context with her earlier statements, Ms. Cutler's statement that the 
debris was insignificant is not a statement that the weight is such a minuscule amount it 
is insignificant, but that whatever the weight is, it is not significant to her results in this 
case. Furthermore, during her testimony, it was never solicited what amount she would 
consider insignificant or not substantially affecting the total weight. This, coupled with 
the fact that Ms. Culter refused to give any estimate of what proportion was 
methamphetamine and what proportion was debris, indicates that the state was 
misrepresenting her testimony when he stated the weight of just the methamphetamine 
in this case was over three and a half grams. 
Therefore, the prosecutor committed misconduct when he misrepresented 
Ms. Cutler's testimony regarding the amount of methamphetamine versus the amount of 
debris in this case. and this misconduct should be reviewed for fundamental error. 
C. The State's Misconduct In This Case Is Not Harmless Error 
Here it simply cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct of 
the prosecutor in this case did not contribute to Mr. Ortiz' conviction. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Sfafe v. Sharp, I01 ldaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034, 
1043 (1980). As argued above in Section I(C), and incorporated herein by reference, 
the State heavily relied on the weight in question to demonstrate that Mr. Ortiz knew of 
the methamphetamine's presence. This went to the heart of the only real element at 
issue in this case, whether Mr. Ortiz "knowingly" possessed methamphetamine. 
Therefore, the State's misrepresentations regarding Ms. Culter's testimony about the 
weight of the evidence cannot be deemed harmless in this case 
The Erroneous Admission Of Preiudicial Evidence And The Prosecutor's Misconduct 
Resulted In Cumulative Error Deprivinq Mr. Ortiz Of A Fair Trial 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, the reversal of a conviction is required when 
there is "'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but 
when aggregated ... show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's 
constitutional right to due process."' State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007) 
(quoting State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998)). Here, even if 
each of the errors by themselves were harmless, the accumulation of these errors 
demonstrates that Mr. Ortiz was denied his right to a fair trial under the United States 
and ldaho Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; ldaho Const., art. I § 13. 
Throughout this case, the prosecution used the total weight of the debris and 
methamphetamine to demonstrate that Mr. Ortiz had to have knowledge of the 
methamphetamine in his car because it was a significant amount and someone would 
not likely leave this amount of methamphetamine behind in someone else's car 
accidentally. (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-13, p.275, L.21 - p.276, L.4.) Unfortunately, 
because debris was mixed in with the methamphetamine, the exact amount of 
methamphetamine was not known. (Trial Tr., p.128, L.7 - p.152, L.11.) However, the 
State was allowed to proceed to introduce evidence regarding the typical consumption, 
packaging, and sales of methamphetamine and argued as if the amount weighed was 
entirely methamphetamine. Thereby, the State gained their conviction by arguing this 
was a substantial amount of methamphetamine this was when the actual weight of the 
methamphetamine in this case was unknown. Therefore, in light of these errors, 
Mr. Ortiz was deprived of a fair trial and his convictions should be vacated and the case 
remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ortiz respectfully requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and 
that this case be remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
DATED this lgih day of March, 2009. 
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